Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies 2011

We are proud to give you information on Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies organized by at Institute of International Education (IIE), Kyung Hee University (KHU) Seoul Korea.

Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies is designed to provide ample opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students to study Korean language more effectively. This aims to provide students who are taking Korean-related classes in Europe, North America and South Asia more in-depth knowledge of Korean language and culture. Over 280 students from 38 countries have been experienced Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies since 2002.

Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies will accomplish many things, including fostering a healthy relationship between people from different cultures, formation of communities for students and a venue for exchanging various materials related to Korean language and culture among students all over the world. This program will be offered during summer as intensive course to students or others who wish to discover Korea and seek valuable cross-cultural experiences. The intensive Korean language classes are conducted entirely in Korean language, emphasizing speaking and listening skills, systematic grammar acquisition, writing skills and cross-cultural communication.

Please introduce Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies to your students and recommend the promising students. Full details of Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies as well are attached with this letter. It will certainly be unforgettable memories and great opportunities for your students to experience the Korean language and culture while participating in Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies.

Kim, Jung Sup, Ph.D

Dean, Institute of International Education

Kyung Hee University



APPLICATION FORM

For Kyung Hee Fellowship for Korean Studies 2011

Institute of International Education (IIE), KYUNG HEE UNIVERSITY, SEOUL KOREA

All applications including this form should be submitted by ONLY e-mail to iiephk@gmail.com from April 20 to May 4.

Please type up this form on a computer.

1. Surname

Photo attached

(PDF file)

Attach the photo in this box after adjusting the photo size (3x4cm)

2. Given Name

3. Korean Name(if any)

4. Nationality(on the passport)

5. Date of Birth

Year / Month / Day : / /

6. Sex

( ) Male ( ) Female

7. Passport No.

8. Permanent Address

(for receiving official documents)

Phone

Address

Mobile Phone

E-mail

9. Information on University

University

Undergraduate:

Graduate (if any):

School Year

Undergraduate: From To

Graduate (if any): From To

Major / Minor (if any)

Undergraduate: /

Graduate (if any): /

GPA (grade point average)

Undergraduate:

Graduate (if any):

Website

10. Information on Recommender or Academic Advisor

Name in full

Title of position in university

Phone

E-mail

11. Fluency in Korean

( ) None ( ) Beginner ( ) Intermediate ( ) Advanced

12. Previous Study of Korean (if any)

Institute

Course/level

/

Period

From To

13. Application for dormitory

( ) Yes – dormitory fee and admission fee (300,000krw) should be paid.

( ) No – admission fee (50,000krw) should be paid.

14. Admission letter for issuing Visa to enter Korea

( ) Necessary – person who have to issue a Korea Visa by request of the Korean Embassy in your country

( ) Unnecessary – person who can stay in Korea for 4 weeks without a Korea Visa

15. Emergency Notification (Person in Korea is preferable)

Name in full

Phone

E-mail

Relationship to you

Monday, March 28, 2011

Scholarships Available for Intensive Japanese and Chinese Summer Language Programs at Beloit College

Since 1983 the Center for Language Studies (CLS) at Beloit College has offered students a unique opportunity to achieve a year's worth of college-level language training in just eight weeks. Excellent faculty, small class sizes that allow for individual attention, and twenty-six hours of classroom instruction per week in a beautiful residential environment provide an immersive approach to learning that encourages students to focus exclusively on the target language and culture. All applicants who apply for the eight-week program, complete the required essay and application materials, and meet the minimum required grade point average (3.0 on a 4.0 scale) are eligible to apply for a CLS Director's Scholarship. These scholarships, ranging from $1,000 to $1,500, are awarded on a competitive basis to qualifying applicants and will be applied toward the program's cost of tuition. Detailed information on our programs can be found at www.beloit.edu/cls. We hope that you will share this information with students in your academic program who have an interest in advancing their language proficiency during the summer.

Friday, March 25, 2011

After the Earthquake & Tsunami: Japan's Nuclear, Economic, & Political Challenges

In the past weeks Japan has suffered unimaginable tragedies, and is still facing colossal obstacles. The Sigur Center for Asian will be hosting an event examining the challenges that Japan now faces in the aftermath of disaster. Dr. Philippe Bardet, Dr. James Kilpatrick, and Dr. Llewelyn Hughes of GWU will all speak on the nuclear, economic, and political challenges that Japan will have to overcome.

For more information, visit the Sigur Center for Asian Studies' blog:

http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/news/index.cfm#earthquake



Thursday, March 24, 2011

Sakura Matsuri Japanese Street Festival Jobs

We are looking for hard working/motivated individuals who are fluent in both Japanese and English to work an exciting event in the Washington DC area on 4/9/11! You must also be able to pass a criminal background check - per our clients request. If you meet these qualifications...WE WANT YOU!!

Location:

51st Sakura Matsuri Japanese Street Festival

Shift Times:

10am-6:30pm

Pay Rate:

Staff - $16/hr

Dress Code:

Black Pants or Khakis, black comfortable shoes and a T-Shirt will be provided for you on-site.

Talent Duties:

Staff hired are responsible for being very energetic and engaging to all of the event attendees. Staff will pass out McDonald’s coupons as well as help facilitate some of the following games/areas:

Giant Spin-Wheel Game

Digital Photography/Green Screen Area

Door Greeters

Gift Bag Distribution

And many more!!!

If you are available to work and can speak both English and Japanese, please email Ryan at rspeer@eventprostrategies.com and confirm your interest/availability!!

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Volunteer Opportunities to Support Relief Efforts in Japan

Local Volunteers Needed to Support Relief Efforts in Japan

The U.S.-Japan Council (USJC), an educational non-profit organization, is raising money to support immediate relief and long-term rebuilding efforts in Japan. In just one week, USJC received $370,000 in donations. 100% of all donations will go Japanese NGOs and NPOs.

This generous outpouring of support is incredible, but requires additional help. In order to allocate funds quickly, provide reports to donors and seek out new opportunities for donations, USJC is looking for volunteer support. By volunteering time and expertise, volunteers will be able to make a tangible impact in Japan. Orientation will take place on Friday, March 25th.

WASHINGTON, DC
Volunteer Opportunity 1 – Social Media Volunteers

About the Opportunity
 Volunteers are needed to search for current news on fundraising efforts throughout the country and update the USJC Facebook page and Twitter Feed.
 Volunteers will search for news and stories related to the earthquake and tsunami that capture human interest stories to be posted as blog entries.
 Volunteers will work in a team environment out of USJC’s office in Dupont Circle.
 Volunteer hours are flexible.
 Volunteers will need to bring their own laptop computers to work on.

Volunteer Opportunity 2 – Language Translators (Japanese to English)

About the Opportunity
 Bilingual volunteers are needed to translate reports from Japanese NGOs so that English-speaking donors can fully understand how their contributions will be used.
 Volunteers will translate and prepare reports that will then be e-mailed to donors and posted online by the USJC Communications Associate.
 Volunteers will work in a team environment out of USJC’s office in Dupont Circle.
 Volunteer hours are flexible.
 Volunteers will need to bring their own laptop computers to work on.

Volunteer Opportunity 3 – U.S.-Japan Council Earthquake Relief Fund Distribution Research

About the Opportunity
 Volunteers will research and report on American company prospects for potential contributions/donor opportunities.
 Volunteers will search for relevant contact information at each company or organization and provide it to USJC Staff for outreach.
 Volunteers will work in a team environment out of USJC’s office in Dupont Circle.
 Volunteer hours are flexible.
 Volunteers will need to bring their own laptop computers to work on.


To Volunteer:

If you are interested in volunteering with USJC, please e-mail volunteers@usjapancouncil.org with:

1. Your name
2. Your availability
3. Which opportunity you are interested in (they are numbered)
4. Your contact information
5. A few sentences about your personal or professional background

Please note that we are requesting all volunteers to contribute a minimum of 4 hours per week for this opportunity.

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

Japan Relief Project

The Sigur Center would like to call your attention to events that GW students will be organizing to raise funds in support of the Japanese survivors of the recent earthquake and tsunami.

This latest earthquake is truly a national tragedy. The Japanese American Student Union is currently planning fundraisers both at the university level and the intercollegiate level. After school restarts on Monday the 21st, we will have tables set up at the Marvin Center to collect donations. At the tables, we will also be selling red wristbands that have "Hope for Japan" inscribed, writing messages to people of the Red Cross, crafting crane-shaped origami (for senbazuru), and recording video messages to upload to our blog, japanreliefproject.com
to encourage the people of Miyagi/Sendai.

At the intercollegiate level, we will be hosting a major fundraising event next Sunday, March 20th from 12pm-3pm at Cafe Asia (1550 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA), open to students, professionals, and the media. The entrance fee is $5.00 and 10% of the food ordered at the restaurant will also go to proceeds. The event will be full of performances (such as taiko playing and yosakoi dancing), and we will also have a Japanese flag to sign to send to the Self Defense Forces.

It will mean a lot to us, members of JASU, to have you support our fundraising efforts.

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

University of llinois/Indiana National Dissertation Workshop: “Chinese Law, Conflict, and Society”-Ph.D. students are encouraged to apply

Illinois/Indiana National Dissertation Workshop: “Chinese Law, Conflict, and Society”

Indiana University Bloomington, July 20-21, 2011.

The Illinois/Indiana East Asia National Resource Center Consortium (IL/IN East Asia NRC) is pleased to announce its fifth annual IL/IN National Dissertation Workshop in the field of Chinese law, conflict, and society. The workshop will be held July 20-21, 2011 on the campus of Indiana University Bloomington. Doctoral students in the humanities, social sciences, and law whose dissertation projects concern Chinese law and social, political, or cultural conflicts in modern and contemporary China are invited to apply. Areas of interest include anthropology, history, legal studies, political science, and sociology, among others. The workshop is designed to enable students just beginning work on their dissertations, as well as those farther along, to engage in intensive discussions of their own and each other’s projects. Possibilities for continuing networks among interested students and faculty will also be explored. The workshop will be limited to eight participants, and the cost of the workshop, some meals, and two nights’ lodging will be covered by the IL/IN East Asia NRC.

Faculty leaders: The workshop will be led by Ho-fung Hung, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Indiana University Bloomington; Klaus Mühlhahn, Professor in the Departments of History and of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Indiana University Bloomington; and SHAO Dan, Assistant Professor in the Departments of East Asian Languages and Cultures and of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Eligibility and application: Applicants must be enrolled full-time in a doctoral program and must have drafted a dissertation research proposal, although they need not have advanced to candidacy. Those in the early phases of writing are also encouraged to apply. In order to prepare the ground for a productive exchange, participants must come to the workshop having read and prepared comments on the other participants’ writing samples.

The application deadline is March 14, 2011. Application materials consist of two items: (1) a current CV and (2) a 4-6-page double-spaced dissertation proposal (including a description of the specific issues being addressed, the intellectual approach, and the materials being studied). Applications should be submitted by e-mail attachment to easc@indiana.edu. Applicants will be informed whether or not they have been selected for the workshop by late April.

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Foreign Policy Debates within Rising Powers: Current Implications for the US

As part of an ongoing outreach to the policy and media communities, the Rising Powers Initiative held a briefing on March 2 to present expert analysis of domestic debates and recent policy developments in Russia, India and China. The event took place at the Elliot School of International Affairs, and was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation.

To understand the foreign policy behaviors of major countries in Asia and Eurasia, the main approach of the Rising Powers Initiative has been to focus on the domestic debates taking place within these countries. These debates reflect a certain intellectual orientation in a country, or its “intellectual DNA,” which is then reflected in that country’s foreign policy, explained Henry R. Nau, who moderated the panel as co-director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University.

Moreover, domestic debates matter most when the external geopolitical environment is relatively stable, said Nau. For the past twenty years, international relations have been characterized by the unipolarity of the United States, and any shift in the international order is gradual. This brings into focus the domestic interpretations of such shifts, and how those interpretations shape the overall direction of a country’s foreign policy.

In Russia, the predominant intellectual orientation has seen a “a lot of volatility” in the past twenty years, said Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beginning with the short-lived “Liberal Westernizers” of 1991-92, Russia’s political landscape then shifted to “Great Power Balancers / Realists” in the 1990s and early 2000s, who were disappointed in the West and believed in a more balanced, multi-vector foreign policy. Today we see the growing influence of the “Nationalists” in domestic debates, who emphasize Russian exceptionalism, centralized economic development, and a more militarized, anti-Western foreign policy. The Nationalists, however, have never been in power, and the Great Power Balancers are still expected to dominate the political scene, noted Kuchins.

Russia’s reactions to current developments in the Middle East also reveal some major tendencies in the Russian outlook. With regard to democracy, Kuchins pointed out that Russia has a long tradition of skepticism, and an even stronger skepticism of democracy in Islamic countries. There has also been a tendency to overestimate the role of the United States in encouraging or enabling uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other countries in the region. What all this actually reveals, said Kuchins, is a deep sensitivity about Russia’s own vulnerability.

India, in contrast, presents a story of marginal shifts in its policy orientation. Deepa Ollapally, co-director of the Rising Powers Initiative and Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, explained that Indian foreign policy is characterized by three main aspects: incrementalism, or a slow pace of change; a continuing commitment to strategic autonomy; and a lingering distrust of the United States. On the last point, the distrust stems from an uncertainty about US reliability on issues ranging from Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, China, and defense trade, said Ollapally. It is within this context that the following main schools of thought are shaping the domestic debates in India: Traditional, Neo-, and Hyper-Nationalists who are wary of the United States and cautiously guard India’s sovereignty; the Great Power Realists, who are akin to the Great Power Balancers in Russia and believe that close relations with the US provides a platform for projecting Indian interests; and the Liberal Globalists, who emphasize international economic power and favor a multilateral approach.

Although the Neo-Nationalists and Hyper-Nationalists are declining in influence, the recent political stalemate over civilian nuclear trade with the United States underscores the pull of various ideological camps in India’s democratic politics, said Ollapally. The deal is supported by Great Power Realists and Liberal Globalists, who comprise the bulk of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s coalition, and cautiously supported by the Traditional Nationalists. However, the Neo- and Hyper-Nationalists are strongly opposed to a deal that would require the signing of a “Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement,” as required by US domestic law. The CISMOA would allow US access to Indian information and communication systems, which these nationalist schools believe would be a severe blow to India’s strategic autonomy.

In China, the spectrum of thought ranges from Nativists and Realists to Multilateralists and Globalists, with the schools of Major Powers, Asia First, Global South falling in between the two ends, according to David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program at the George Washington University (for more detail, see Shambaugh’s recent article in the Washington Quarterly). Understanding the domestic “debates” in China, however, is not as straightforward as it might be in other countries. On the one hand, where schools of thought are identified primarily with non-governmental actors, it is difficult to link their ideas to actual policy. On the other hand, these ideas are coming out of universities and think tanks that are all affiliated with the government. The point to keep in mind is that the schools of thought are not mutually exclusive, emphasized Shambaugh.

Officially, the Chinese government has outlined four main pillars in its foreign policy platform: relations with major powers are key; the surrounding areas are a first priority; developing countries are the foundation; and multilateral organizations are an important stage. These are all complementary, explained Shambaugh, and the key question is, which pillar is emphasized?

In the past four months, the Chinese have made a visible effort to repair its relations with the rest of the world, after a series of aggressive behaviors in 2009-2010 resulted in what Shambaugh characterized as arguably “the worst year in Chinese foreign relations in a decade.” There clearly is some “recalibration” taking place in China’s foreign policy, as demonstrated by President Hu Jintao’s recent state visit to the US, as well as other bilateral visits between China and major European countries, and the China-ASEAN Summit in October. Just last week, China voted in favor of UN sanctions against Libya. Nevertheless, these actions are more telling of the pragmatic strand of thinking in the Chinese leadership, rather than any major shift in the intellectual orientation of Chinese foreign policymaking, said Shambaugh. For the most part, the Nativist and Realist schools are still predominant.

In all, what emerges from the domestic debates in each country is the intellectual “center of gravity” of that country’s foreign policymaking, concluded Henry R. Nau. That “center” is both the reflection and the basis of a country’s policy style and orientation, and shifts in the center may be indicative of some vulnerability or uncertainty in a country’s position. The shifting intellectual landscape in India, for instance, may indicate that India is somewhat outside its “comfort zone” of strategic autonomy. Realist and nationalist sentiments, on the other hand, remain strong in Russia and China. The shape of these debates is an ongoing research focus of the Rising Powers Initiative, which will present its findings in greater depth at an upcoming conference on April 25. Comments from the public are welcome.

Written by Amy Hsieh, Research Assistant, PhD Candidate, Political Science

LETTERS FROM ABROAD: Middle Eastern Upheaval in Shanghainese Eyes

By Erik Walenza-Slabe
Foreign Correspondent
March 7, 2011

Ask around on the streets of Shanghai about political upheaval in the Middle East and expect a sea of indifference. The nature of that indifference depends upon whom you ask, but the core sentiment seldom wavers. Xiao Zhang, a fruit vendor in a wet market, represents the most pervasive attitude: “I’m just a small person with real concerns...” As with many Shanghainese, Ms. Zhang was unaware that democratic reform undergirded many of the demonstrations. Government censors limit coverage of the protests, ensuring, instead, that the Chinese media highlight the ensuing turmoil rather than the peoples’ grievances with their governments.

In contrast, the cosmopolitan youth who frequent the posh cafés and clubs of the area known as the French Concession have likely stumbled across uncensored accounts of the protests while browsing English websites. They are also more likely to voice an opinion, but opinions in Shanghai’s cafés often lack vitality. Democratic sentimentalities are strongly discouraged in China. They are neither taught in school, nor tolerated in public dialogue.

But, perhaps most importantly in this most capitalist of cities, political ideologies are not profitable.

For young Shanghainese, concern over the democratic yearnings of distant peoples is at best a pointless diversion and, at worst, a fine way to stunt a promising career. This is not to say that Shanghai lacks a political conscience. Shan Wang, a recent political science graduate, promptly quit his post with a prominent newspaper after being tasked with the responsibility of deleting user comments that contrasted with the party line.

Wang is as happy as any Elliott School student to spend an afternoon discussing the prospects for political reform in China. He also actively seeks government employment. He knows political dreams will not support his parents or attract a wife. A promising government post on the other hand… China is, above all, a pragmatic nation.

However, not all foreign policy issues are so far removed from Shanghai’s attention as Middle East politics. Events involving the balance of power vis-a-vis the United States or Japan are more likely to engender interest. China’s economic ascendance is covered so comprehensively that retired grandmothers in the park display a surprisingly robust appreciation of key macroeconomic issues.

Domestically, there is also strikingly little interest in actively seeking political reform. The causes of this reticence can be attributed to cultural, structural and economic dimensions. Culturally, Chinese are relatively hesitant to challenge authority, be it in the home, the office or the government. A young office worker is as unlikely to request a promotion as is he inclined to public demonstration. Even when Chinese privately complain of government corruption or rising prices -- as they often do -- the possibility of protest does not enter the conversation.

Of course, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has erected an impressive array of structural impediments to public demonstration. A small army of Internet censors removes provocative content and monitors social media networks for signs of nascent coordination. Facebook, Twitter and an assortment of smaller networking and file sharing websites are banned. Print and television media are likewise heavily regulated and monitored. This may be considered the soft side of the CCP’s defense against inconvenient ideas.

There is also a hard side, as was apparent during the recently attempted Chinese version of the “Jasmine Revolution”. Despite the organizers’ inability to reach and mobilize a large following (thanks largely to Internet censors), the gathering points were preemptively saturated with hundreds of police officers. Beijing is clearly unwilling to allow the smallest buds of public activism to develop.

Economic factors are also at play. While life remains difficult for many farmers, laborers and recent college graduates, incomes are rising quickly. The government has demonstrated its awareness of the danger of a widening income gap by seeking to double the minimum wage nationwide by 2015. This is part of a larger move to increase the importance of consumption relative to investments, a move that should simulate the emergence of a middle class.

Shanghai is prosperous relative to the Chinese average, but it is also relatively expensive. Given the importance of owning (or at least renting) a decent apartment prior to marriage, housing prices are a constant concern for bachelors. Recent droughts in the north and floods in the south have driven up food prices, which had already been rising at a worrisome clip. Nonetheless, abject poverty is rare and there does not exist in Shanghai, or in most of China, the sense of economic stagnation that helped spur the Egyptian protests.

Finally, China’s rising economic and political clout help moderate political sentiments. The Chinese form a proud nation, and the Shanghainese may be the proudest among them. So long as China’s economy and international stature continue to march forward, the government will enjoy emotional legitimacy. Should the long march falter, the streets might indeed become alive. For now, politically at least, the Shanghainese remain a small people with their own concerns.


Erik Walenza-Slabe is pursuing a joint MA International Affairs and MBA and was a Sigur Center Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellow last summer for Chinese language study in China.

http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/288

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Popular Uprisings in Southeast Asia: Is there an Egypt or Tunisia in the Region?

Southeast Asia is unlikely to see an Egyptian-style popular protest leading to regime change in the near future, though it still offers lessons to the current wave of uprisings taking place across the Middle East and North Africa, said Southeast Asia expert Catharin Dalpinoat a public lecture organized by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University.

Catharin Dalpino, who is also an Adjunct Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at GWU, outlined five main reasons that the recent experience of Tunisia and Egypt will not be replicated in Southeast Asia:

  • The region is not prone to contagion effects. Historical experience shows that political disturbances in one country have had limited impact beyond borders. Even during the Vietnam War, the ripple effect extended only to Cambodia and Laos, despite what the domino theory of the time had predicted.
  • Southeast Asian countries have little in common. Whereas the Middle Eastern and North African countries generally share an anti-Western sentiment, there is no such “regional angst” in Southeast Asia, said Dalpino. In contrast, Southeast Asia is “more at peace with itself and the outside world than ever before.” However, it is possible that anti-China sentiments are brewing in the region, as seen by recent tensions over China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, or reactions to China’s economic maneuvers throughout the region.
  • Most of the tenured political leaders have already left office, and thus there is no longer an individual in Southeast Asia whose prolonged rule would provide a focal point for a popular uprising, as did Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 30 years in office. Even in Southeast Asian countries where the political system remains authoritarian, there has already been some transition of power. Instead, what now characterizes the political landscape is the dominance of dynasties and oligarchies of power, yet “people don’t seem too bothered” by this persistence of “inherited power,” said Dalpino. The only current leader who is more akin to Mubarak would be Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, but Hun Sen’s leadership is one that has endured several political shifts and coalitions.
  • Socioeconomic conditions have improved. Whereas a high rate of unemployment has been cited as one of the factors that sparked the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the socioeconomic conditions in Southeast Asia are generally better than that in the Middle East and North Africa. Although many people are still poor, most of them have seen enough improvement economically over the recent years.
  • Political Islam is integrated into mainstream politics. On the question of political participation of Islamist groups, Southeast Asia’s response has been to “let them into the tent,” said Dalpino. In Malaysia, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party has been a serious contender in elections. On the other hand, Indonesia’s approach has been to marginalize the radical Islamist parties, while incorporating some of their platforms into the mainstream parties.

Dalpino further pointed out that many of the revolts in Southeast Asia have been organized around elections, whereas the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were not timed with an electoral cycle. She said this suggests that semi-authoritarian countries with dominant party regimes might be more vulnerable than strictly authoritarian or more democratic ones. In other words, it is the people’s “dashed expectations” that are the spark of popular discontent and mass reactions. In this context, Dalpino identified Myanmar as a plausible candidate for further uprisings, as it remains to be seen how much power-sharing will be allowed in light of the country’s recent elections and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Finally, the wave of popular uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa could draw a lesson from Southeast Asia. Citing the examples of Thailand and the Philippines, both of which have seen repeated mass movements challenging the ruling regime, Dalpino warned that “people power revolts can be habit-forming” but do not necessarily lead to substantive change. “People power can open the door to reform, but doesn’t constitute reform,” she concluded.

Catharin Dalpino is currently the Joan M. Warburg Professor of International Relations at Simmons College; Visiting Scholar in Southeast Asian Studies, John Hopkins/SAIS; Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University; and Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States. A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, she has also been a Fellow at the Brookings Institution; a Resident Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and a career officer with The Asia Foundation. She specializes in political development and security in Southeast Asia, and is a frequent media commentator and editor of several articles and op-eds on US policy in Southeast Asia.

-- Written by Amy Hsieh via the Rising Powers Initiative Blog

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Conversations with Scholars: Thoughts on US-China Relations with Bruce Reynolds and James Kilpatrick

Earlier this afternoon, the Organization of Asian Studies (OAS) hosted an informal luncheon (complete with catering by Au Bon Pain!) with Bruce Reynolds and James Kilpatrick. Professor Bruce Reynolds is a professor of economics at the University of Virginia and a visiting scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs Institute for International Economic Policy. In the 1980s, Professor Reynolds was one of the first American economists to live in China and study Chinese economic reform. Professor James Kilpatrick is an adjunct professor of economics and international affairs at George Washington University. He traveled extensively in China and Japan and has published numerous articles on China and economics including "Chinese Grain Production: Interpretation of the Data" (China Quarterly, 1978) and “Distinctive Patterns and Prospects in China-Latin America Trade, 1999-2005" (Journal of International Commerce and Economics, 2006).

These two scholars, who are old friends from the economics PhD program at the University of Michigan, offered their insights on the implications of economics for US-China relations. First, Professor Reynolds told how he got interested in China, which began with a Chinese language course during his undergraduate years at Yale University, two years teaching English in Taiwan (he taught at Yujie Zhou's (the treasurer of OAS) high school!), and PhD program at University of Michigan. He gave a few lessons for the students of the audience too: he encouraged us to shake things up and explore. You never know where a beginning language class will lead. Professor Kilpatrick also shared his experiences serving in the US Army, as well as traveling and living in China and Japan.

The two scholars then discussed various topics including an optimistic view of China's peaceful rise, scapegoating, and the exchange-rate controversy. They also answered questions, including topics on trade distortion, labor rights and food prices. It was an incredibly engaging discussion and a great way for OAS members and GW students to come together for this rare opportunity to talk with top China scholars. The OAS executive board is already planning for two more "Conversations with Scholars" events, so stay posted for more events after Spring Break. Email us at oas1@gwu.edu to add your email address to the listerve or for more information on OAS events. The OAS is sponsored by generous support from the Sigur Center and GWU Student Activities Center.